been understood to mean the time and method in which punishment was imposed, requiring an imposition immediately upon the occurrence of the contemptuous act. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925) .
Perhaps the Supreme Court returned to the rationale of the Cooke case in Offutt v'. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (i954). See note 19 infra.
'Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932) : "It has never been doubted by this court, or any other so far as we know, that notice and hearing are preliminary steps essential to the passing of an enforceable judgment, and that they, together with a legally but, on the other hand, it is said to be essential to the preservation of those very values which it offends. 4 For, since fairness in the administration of justice can be guaranteed only to the extent that a court can maintain order, dignity, and impartiality in its proceedings, the summary contempt power is defended as a measure necessary for preserving this proper decorum. 5 In seeking to confine the exercise of this power within the limits of its rationale, the courts have settled upon the phrase "in the presence of the court," or some variant thereof, 6 to define contemptuous conduct competent tribunal having jurisdiction of the case, constitute basic elements of the constitutional requirements of due process of law"; Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522 (9z7): "That officers acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity are disqualified by their interest in the controversy to be decided is, of course, the general rule"; Rochin v. California, 34z U.S. 165 (1888) ] that under such circumstances a judge has power to punish an offender at once, without notice and hearing, although his conduct may also be punishable as a criminal offense. This Court reached its decision because it believed that a court's business could not be conducted unless it could suppress disturbances within the courtrom by immediate punishment." See also cases cited in note 5 infra. (x835) ("so near the presence of the court as to obstruct the administration which can be termed "ldirect"-and hence summarily punishable. This phrase, in addition, recognizes that, in fairness to the accused, only a judge who could observe the contemptuous nature of the conduct in open court should be invested with this power.' Having adopted this short-hand formula, some courts have, however, ignored the broader considerations to which the phrase was intended to give expression and, by an uncritical application, have rationalized the imposition of summary punishment in exactly the type of situation which it was designed to exclude. and in the light of their ordinary meaning, we conclude that they are to be construed as geographical terms." Savin, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 267, 277 (1889) (attempted bribery in a witness waiting room) : "We are of opinion that, within the meaning of the statute, the court, at least when in session, is present in every part of the place set apart for its own use, and for the use of its officers, jurors and witnesses; and misbehavior anywhere in such place is misbehavior in the presence of the court." In Weldon v. State, 150
Ark. 407, z34 S.W. 4.66 (i92), defendant in a pending case attacked the judge at a beach resort. The imposition of summary punishment by that judge for contempt was affirmed on the ground that the assault occurred in the "constructive presence" of the court. Cf. State -v. Goff, 88 S.E.2d 788 (S.C. 1955), where an assault committed on the back steps of the courthouse, while the court was in recess and the jury retired to consider a verdict, was held a direct contempt, since the court was "present" throughout the building in which it sat. In United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (i9o6) (on demurrer), 714 U.S. 386 (19o9) (on the merits), a Negro was lynched on the day his appeal from a rape conviction had been granted by the United States Supreme Court. The Court exercised original jurisdiction to "punish summarily" the sheriff and the leaders of the mob.
.
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Illustrative is the recent case of Lyons v. Superior Court,' where the question presented was whether petitioner's tardiness, when he was sole counsel for defendant in a felony proceeding, was a "direct" contempt of court, for which he could be sentenced summarily to the county jail. In affirming the trial court's summary punishment, the majority reasoned that the tardiness was such a participation in the trial as to be within the immediate view and presence of the court and that it tended to obstruct the administration of justice." 0 Since the court could observe the fact that petitioner was absent, there is no surface difficulty in concluding that the absence occurred "in the presence of the court."" But, clearly, only inexcusable tardiness is contemptuous,' 2 and the lack of an excuse would be an element essential to petitioner's contempt conviction. Inasmuch as the court had no firsthand knowledge as to whether the contempt was excusable, then only by a mechanical application of the "formula" could it conclude that the contempt was "direct" and summarily punishable. Furthermore, it is evident that the obstruction to the administration of justice, which had already occurred, could hardly be redressed by imposing summary punishment; nor could the dignity of the court be vindicated any better in a summary than in a plenary proceeding.
This latter observation raises the broader question as to whether there actually are any situations in which the summary contempt power is necessary to accomplish the ends which purportedly justify its use. It is suggested that the reasoning advanced to sustain this power often 43 Cal.zd 755, 278 P.zd 681 (x955).
"0 Petitioner offered illness as an excuse for his tardiness of thirty-five minutes. The court declined to believe this excuse, noting that petitioner had been habitually tardy. Compare In re McHugh, 152 Mich. 5o5, z16 N.W. 459 (z908), where the court held that an attorney's voluntary offer of a defense in a summary proceeding constituted a waiver of his right to a later plenary trial. If the courts are to hold that a contemnor, in offering an explanation or excuse in such cases, waives his right to notice and hearing, attorneys will certaintly be discouraged from offering any defense, even thought it might be substantial. Such a practice would seem undesirable, in view of the probability that most contempt situations are cleared up by explanation and apology.
" But see the language of the court in Ex parte Clark, zo8 Mo. 121, 148, io6 S.W. 990, 997 (1907) : "It would seem like an exquisite and palpable contradiction of terms to complain in one breath that the petitioner and his acts were absent, and in the next breath to say that such absence constituted a presence .... NOTES fails to distinguish between punishment which is sufficient to remove an obstruction to the administration of justice, or to vindicate the dignity of the court, and punishment which is necessary to accomplish these purposes. 13 Indeed, if the test of necessity is applied to the various situations in which the power has been invoked, the apparent conclusion is that it has no justification at all. 14 Consider, for example, the dearest case-a calculated disturbance in the courtroom, intended by its perpetrator not only to obstruct the proceeding, but to insult the court. Instead of punishing the offender summarily, the judge could order him arrested immediately and charged with the crime of contempt. The obstruction to the administration of justice would thereby be removed; and the vindication of the dignity of the court could be postponed to a separate hearing.
At least one commentator has maintained that the summary contempt power should continue to be tolerated as a petty power to deal with petty offenses. 15 To this it might be answered that, if the offenses are petty, they should not justify an exception to constitutional procedural rights. 10 The only basis for such an exception is not expediency, but necessity; and, absent a necessity, the exception should fail.' Therefore it would seem that the "necessity" which justifies such a sui generis power must be a strict necessity-not merely an expediency. Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 543 (1917) (reasoning that the power rests "solely" upon "the right of self-preservation") ; Anderson v. Dunn, 5 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 6x (x821).
" See I COMPLETE WORKS OF EDWARD LIVINGSTON ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE 258-267 (1873). Mr. Livingston contends that the "plea of necessity" should be limited to the power to remove obstructions to the courts' orderly processes and does not justify the existence of summary power to punish for contempt. He points out that in this one area, a judge holds all three governmental functions--to define, prosecute and punish such offenses. Since judges are only human, he urges that all contempts should be statutorily defined as criminal offenses and punishable only in accordance with this defined law. Degrees of contempt would be recognized and the offender would, therefore, be dealt with according to the nature of his offense. If an attorney were charged with contempt during a trial, the hearing on this charge could be deferred until the end of the trial.
Nelles, op. dit. supra note 7.
x Comment, 33 YALE L.J. 536 (1924) (if the punishment is inflicted to deter others, then it is purely penal in character, and the alleged contemnor should be afforded the protections granted a defendant in a criminal trial Reconsideration by the courts of a power so discordant with due process is always timely, though its existence has long been asserted. At the present, there is some indication that reconsideration is taking place and may eventually lead to the complete abolition of this power. 18 It is submitted that such an abolition would be consistent with the efficient administration of justice and would better accord with the requirements of a fair trial.
PAUL V. EVANS
18 Due process of law requires notice and hearing before an impartial tribunal. See note 3 supra. In Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954) , the Court, relying on Cooke v. United States, 267 U.s. 517 (1925) , held that when a judge becomes personally "embroiled" with an attorney during a trial, fairness requires that the offended judge may not impose summary punishment, but instead another judge must hear the contempt proceeding. The result is to grant the accused a full, plenary hearing, under the holding of the Cooke case, supra. Having taken this first step, so soon after the decision in Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (x952), see note z supra, the present Court may well eventually take the second, completely abolishing summary punishment.
